Dissertation:
Legal Militias: The Case of Convivir Groups in Colombia
In my dissertation, I examine an understudied feature of civil wars: legal militias. These are armed groups that receive formal recognition from the state but remain separate from regular forces like the police or military. I argue that legalization encourages militia formation by lowering the costs of mobilization. This dynamic is most likely to occur in areas that combine two conditions: a high insurgent threat, which creates demand for protection, and high land inequality, which gives local elites strong incentives to mobilize. Once formed, legal militias influence civilian–armed group collaboration and civilian victimization by providing local intelligence and making the armed landscape more legible to the state and its allies.
Peer-Reviewed Publications
Making, Updating, and Querying Causal Models with
CausalQueries
with Till Tietz, Georgiy Syunyaev, and Macartan Humphreys
Conditionally accepted, Journal of Statistical Software (2025)Citizen Attitudes Toward Traditional and State Authorities: Substitutes or Complements?
with Peter van der Windt, Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey F. Timmons, and Maarten Voors
Comparative Political Studies (2019) — Article | Replication
Ongoing Work
(Class) Disparities in Policing
Solo-authored paper
Working paper available upon requestMarching for Change: Quantifying the Effects of Women’s Rights Protests on Legislation and Femicide in Mexico
with Johanna Reyes
Early draft available upon requestNextGenC: Survey on Youth Political Participation in Intermediate Cities in Colombia
In the field